Provable Security of 3GPP Integrity Algorithm f9 


Vol. 9,  No. 4, pp. 573-580, Aug.  2002
10.3745/KIPSTC.2002.9.4.573


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  Abstract

Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there is a standardised integrity algorithm . The integrity algorithm computes a MAC to authenticate the data integrity and data origin of signalling data over a radio access link of W-CDMA IMT-2000. is a variant of the standard CBC MAC based on the block cipher KASUMI. In this paper we provide the provable security of . We prove that is secure by giving concrete bound on an adversary's inability to forge in terms of her inability to distinguish the underlying block cipher from a pseudorandom permutation.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

D. W. Hong, S. U. Shin, H. S. Ryu, K. I. Chung, "Provable Security of 3GPP Integrity Algorithm f9," The KIPS Transactions:PartC, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 573-580, 2002. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2002.9.4.573.

[ACM Style]

Do Won Hong, Sang Uk Shin, Heui Su Ryu, and Kyo Il Chung. 2002. Provable Security of 3GPP Integrity Algorithm f9. The KIPS Transactions:PartC, 9, 4, (2002), 573-580. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2002.9.4.573.