Side-channel Attack on the Final Round SHA-3 Candidate Skein 


Vol. 19,  No. 3, pp. 179-184, Jun.  2012
10.3745/KIPSTC.2012.19.3.179


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  Abstract

Due to the absence of an alternative algorithm SHA-2, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) is proceeding to development project of SHA-3. NIST announced five candidates of the final round at the end of 2010. Side-channel attack scenarios of five candidates for SHA-3 final round have been proposed. In this paper, we prove the possibility of the analysis against 32-bit modular addition by 8-bit blocks from our experiment on ARM chip board with a register size of 32-bit. In total we required 9700 power traces to successfully recover the 128-bit secret key for the attack against.

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[IEEE Style]

A. S. Park, J. Y. Park, D. G. Han, O. Y. Yi, "Side-channel Attack on the Final Round SHA-3 Candidate Skein," The KIPS Transactions:PartC, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 179-184, 2012. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2012.19.3.179.

[ACM Style]

Ae Sun Park, Jong Yeon Park, Dong Guk Han, and Ok Yeon Yi. 2012. Side-channel Attack on the Final Round SHA-3 Candidate Skein. The KIPS Transactions:PartC, 19, 3, (2012), 179-184. DOI: 10.3745/KIPSTC.2012.19.3.179.

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