Performance and Security Analysis of Redzone-based Sanitizers 


Vol. 14,  No. 10, pp. 739-745, Oct.  2025
https://doi.org/10.3745/TKIPS.2025.14.10.739


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  Abstract

This paper analyzes four Redzone-based memory sanitizers—AddressSanitizer, ReZZan, FloatZone, and RangeSanitizer—in terms of design, detection approach, performance overhead, and implementation complexity. AddressSanitizer uses shadow memory for accurate detection but incurs significant overhead. ReZZan eliminates metadata for lightweight operation but has limited coverage. FloatZone reduces overhead using FPU exceptions, though it may produce false positives. RangeSanitizer adopts metadata-based range checks to improve detection efficiency and execution speed. Experimental evaluation using SPEC CPU 2017 and the Juliet Test Suite reveals trade-offs in speed, memory usage, and accuracy, providing insights into selecting suitable sanitizers for diverse environments.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

S. M. Kang, J. Y. Park, D. H. Kwon, "Performance and Security Analysis of Redzone-based Sanitizers," The Transactions of the Korea Information Processing Society, vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 739-745, 2025. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3745/TKIPS.2025.14.10.739.

[ACM Style]

Seung Min Kang, Jae Yeol Park, and Dong Hyeon Kwon. 2025. Performance and Security Analysis of Redzone-based Sanitizers. The Transactions of the Korea Information Processing Society, 14, 10, (2025), 739-745. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3745/TKIPS.2025.14.10.739.